Technical artifacts have the capacity to fulfill their function in virtue of their physicochemical makeup. An explanation that purports to explicate this relation between artifact function and structure can be called a technological explanation. It might be argued, and Peter Kroes has in fact done so, that there is something peculiar about technological explanations in that they are intrinsically normative in some sense. Since the notion of artifact function is a normative one (if an artifact has a proper function, it ought to behave in specific ways) an explanation of an artifact's function must inherit this normativity.
Introduction
To introduce the topic of this paper, here are two observations about technical artifacts. First, technical artifacts have proper functions; that is the very reason behind our designing, making, and using them. They have their functions partly in virtue of their physicochemical make-up.
One cannot reasonably ascribe the function to f to an artifact, which one knows to have an utterly inappropriate physicochemical constitution -a pencil cannot function as a laptop computer. Hence, there must be some sort of explanatory link between an artifact's function and its physicochemical make-up (or, for short, its 'structure'). When one wants to understand how it is that artifact x has the function to f, there will be mention of x's structure at some point.
Second, the notion of proper function is a normative one. It makes sense to say of an artifact that it ought to exhibit certain behaviors, namely those associated with its function.
Such claims do not make sense for normal physical objects, such as stones, solar systems, or sugar molecules. 1 There can be discrepancies between an artifact's proper function and its actual behavioral capacities. An artifact can have the function to f even though it cannot f. A 1 At least not in as strong a sense as for artifacts. Of course we can express our (sometimes strongly) inductively supported beliefs about the behavior of physical objects in terms of normative 'ought to'-claims, but it is not as if we have some sort of right to expect physical objects to behave as we desire -as is the case for technical artifacts (cf. Franssen 2006) . More on this in sections 4 and 5.
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If we combine these two observations we arrive at the conclusion that there is something peculiar about technological explanations -i.e. explanations that account for an artifact's function in terms of its structure. Since (1) there must be an explanatory link between an artifact's function and its structure, and (2) the notion of artifact function is normative, it seems to follow that technological explanations are special by being inherently normative.
Or so Peter Kroes (1998; 2001) argues. It is my aim in this paper to scrutinize this argument for I think it runs together a couple of different points about artifact functions and explanations. In the next section, I will present Kroes's arguments in more detail. Section 3 contains internal criticism of his arguments, and in section 4 I will argue that there is a more fundamental confusion underlying Kroes's arguments and I will show how we can dispose of this confusion by analyzing his endeavor in two separate projects. We need to distinguish between a theory of artifact functions on the one hand and an account of technological explanations on the other. The former should deal with the normativity of functions, so that the latter can then pass the buck. The rest of the paper serves to flesh out this reply; in section 5 I will present a specific theory of artifact functions and show how it can be combined with an account of technological explanation in the way I envisaged in section 4. Section 6 contains the conclusion.
2 There are limits here; one would be hard-pressed to still call a television set that has been smashed to a thousand pieces with a jackhammer a television set.
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Kroes on Technological Explanations and Normativity 3
To argue his point about the peculiarity of technological explanations, Kroes first observes that technical artifacts have a dual nature. They are physical objects, but they also have intentional or functional properties essentially. As a result, we can give both functional and physicalistic descriptions of artifacts, with either description partially or wholly black-boxing the other. A clock is any time-keeping device, whatever its exact physicochemical make-up and, alternatively, someone without any experience with pencils cannot deduce that a 6-inch hexagonal elongated piece of wood with a lead inside is for writing (though she might discover that it can be used for writing). The two descriptions are logically independent and, as a result, it is impossible to deduce function from structure or the other way around.
Standard deductive-nomological explanations are barred.
Next, he presents an example of a technological explanation that involves the Newcomen steam engine. The main function of Newcomen steam engines was to drive water pumps.
They did so by means of the up-and-down movements of their great beam. The great beam itself was driven by the actual steam engine that consisted of a boiler, a steam valve, and a cylinder with moving piston (see Figure 1) . Roughly, the explanation of these engines has three ingredients.
(1) Physical laws or phenomena, e.g., that steam occupies a much larger volume than does water, that rapid condensation of steam in a closed vessel creates a partial vacuum, that atmospheric pressure exerts a force on the piston.
(2) The physical make-up and configuration of the engine, e.g., the boiler, steam valve, movable piston, and great beam.
3 This section summarizes sections 4 and 5 of (Kroes 1998 Kroes rightly observes that it does not follow from an explanation along these lines that the function of the steam engine is to drive pumps, nor that it is to move the great beam up and down. All that follows is that the steam engine can be used to drive pumps, that it is a means to that end, or that it has the capacity to drive pumps. It is impossible to get the normative explanandum containing the ascription of a proper function from the purely descriptive explanans. He concludes that the explanation as presented is not a technological explanation since it does not properly account for the steam engine's function in terms of its structure. Kroes (2001: 38-9 ) contains a sketchy possible repair. Perhaps, says Kroes, the relation between explanandum and explanans can be conceived in terms of pragmatic rules of actions that are grounded in causal relations. For example, if one's goal is to drive a water pump, and a steam engine has the capacity to do so (i.e., something like the following causal conditional holds: If the steam engine is put to use properly in appropriate circumstances, it will drive a water pump), then one can infer the following rule of action: To drive a water pump, use a Newcomen steam engine. In this context of action, the steam engine is a means to an end and acquires a function. The engine's physical structure still figures indirectly, since the rule of action is formulated on the basis of a causal conditional that was derived from the engine's structure. Kroes concludes: "A technological explanation, therefore, is not a deductive explanation, but it connects structure and function on the basis of causal relations and pragmatic rules of action based on these causal relations. " (2001: 39 if it is operated properly, one could use it to pump water if one wants so, but -and this illustrates the chief difficulty -in the same vein we can add that, if it can be used to tear stuff apart, one could use it to tear stuff apart if that is what one wants. One can use an electric guitar to play licks, and if one so desires, it would be rational to use it for that purpose, but if one is in a rockstar-type of mood, a guitar can also be used to smash loudspeakers, and it would be no less rational to use it to that end. None of this, however, goes to show that Newcomen's steam engine is for tearing stuff apart or that smashing loudspeakers is an electric guitar's proper function.
Although the fact that something has a number of capacities that can be expressed in terms of causal conditionals warrants inferences to various rules of action (under the assumptions mentioned), nothing supports one of these rules in particular as the proper one, and neither does the artifact considered in isolation give you any reason to suppose that one of these causal capacities is the artifact's proper function, as opposed to an accidental or system
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do not see how it could sustain proper function ascriptions. In the end, the suggested repair is not much of an improvement over Kroes's initial proposal. All that can be inferred from action rules is that if a certain artifact can be used to accomplish some end, then it is rational to use it to that end, but that follows virtually analytically (again, given some background assumptions) from the fact that it is a means to that end, and that was already established in the initial proposal.
Functions: To Ascribe and to Explain
Given that Kroes's project leads to a dead end considered by its own lights, let us now take a step back and turn to the second point. I will argue that there is a more fundamental confusion vexing the project. Unearthing this confusion will also enable us to see why his project really was a non-starter. Kroes stipulates that a technological explanation is an explanation that accounts for an artifact's proper function in terms of its physicochemical make-up. This construal is, I think, seriously misguided because it runs together two rather different projects, to wit (1) that of giving an account of proper function ascriptions and (2) that of explaining how, in virtue of its physicochemical make-up, an artifact can fulfill its function. The result of (1) is a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the truth or assertibility of claims like 'artifact x has proper function f.' It is fairly obvious that this set will contain more conditions than just those related to the x's physicochemical make-up -that is in fact the negative result of Kroes's argument: claims about proper functions cannot be deduced solely from information about the artifact's physicochemical make-up. But it is not so obvious that something like a highly detailed account of x's workings must be among these conditions, for that would mean that no one except highly knowledgeable engineers could ever be justified or correct in claiming that an artifact has a proper function. Project (2) (1) and (2) while drawing exclusively on the means for project (2). That is an impossible task.
An analogy will help to clarify the reason why. Suppose we want to explain why the function of the heart is to pump blood, or, more precisely, to determine whether the proper function of the heart is to pump blood. Surely, an elaborate scrutiny of hearts and their behavior by itself will not allow us to conclude that their proper function is to pump blood, yet this is the only option open to us on an extrapolated version of Kroes's proposal, since he seems to be thinking that an item's proper function could be determined just by looking at its physicochemical make-up. Instead, we should distinguish the project of spelling out the truth or assertibility conditions for "The function of the heart is to pump blood", from that of explaining how the heart is able to pump blood. Accounting for the fact that the function of the heart is to pump blood is not the same as accounting for how it can pump blood. The first project will involve more than just the heart's 'intrinsic' properties. Biological function theories disagree on exactly what more; some suggest synchronic relational properties such as the heart's current contribution to organism fitness (Walsh 1996; Lewens 2004) , others look at diachronic relational (historical) properties such as the heart's ancestors contribution to ancestor fitness (Millikan 1984 (Millikan , 1993 Neander 1991a Neander , 1991b . The outcome of the second project, however, will look more like Kroes's proposed explanans. It will explicate how the physicochemical make-up of the heart and its constituent parts in their particular configuration leads to dynamic behaviors that, in the appropriate environment, add up to pumping blood.
The crucial point is that accounting for an item's proper function, on the one hand, cannot be done without taking the item's environment into account, be it its current ecological niche, Final Draft -January 20, 2006 11 its history, its ancestors, its users, its designers, or their intentions and/or (justified) beliefs.
Proper functions are not among the intrinsic properties of an item and therefore they cannot be discovered by solely looking at the item itself, isolated from its environment. An item's capacities and its behaviors, on the other hand, are among its intrinsic properties and can be explained by looking just at the item's physicochemical constitution and mereological makeup. The two projects are largely independent. One can be justified, even correct, in ascribing proper functions to organs or artifacts without knowing how they are able to perform that function, and, alternatively, one can explain how it is that organs or artifacts (or their parts)
have the capacities they have or show the behaviors they show without knowing that one of these capacities or behaviors is associated with a proper function. Of course, one is typically interested in an explanation of how an organ or artifact can perform the behavior associated with its proper function, since that tends to be its most interesting feature (that computers can function as paperweights is not the reason people buy them).
What I have said so far should not be taken to imply that the projects are entirely unrelated;
I have only argued that it is unwise to try and tackle them in one fell swoop. I now want to look at possible connections, two in particular. The first one is that an explanation of how something is able to perform its function might pop up in the justification for its having that function. Roughly, the intuition is that function ascriptions must have something to do with the actual behavioral capacities an object has, at least for paradigm exemplars of the object. In order to justify the claim 'x has proper function f' (where x is a normal exemplar of its type)
there must be evidence that x can in fact f, and an adequate explanation of how x can f would be very good evidence, albeit not the only permissible type of evidence. Naïve theories of artifact functions overlook this intuition. Consider a theory that defines the function of an
artifact to be what the designer intended the artifact to do. Such a theory lacks the evidencerequirement and thereby fails to link claims about proper functions to (evidence of) actual
Final Draft -January 20, 2006 12 capacities. As a result, it allows for crazy function ascriptions. A mad designer's intention to build a spacecraft from a bunch of matchsticks does not warrant the conclusion that the result he produces is a spacecraft, for there is no way in which matchsticks could ever compose a spacecraft, at least not by current scientific lights. So the first way in which the two projects are related is by way of justification. An explanation of how something can fulfill its function can be among the justificatory grounds for the claim that an artifact has that proper function.
The second connection appears in malfunction cases: situations where an item still has a proper function, even though it cannot perform that function. I assume that such cases do exist, both in biology and technology; malfunctioning hearts are still for pumping blood, and the proper function of a worn-out light bulb still is to provide light. 4 For malfunction cases, the second project I identified takes on a slightly different form, since the question of how the artifact can perform its function is obsolete when we know that it cannot perform its function.
What can be explained, however, and what is not obsolete, is how the artifact was supposed to perform its function. An answer to that question will look a lot like the answer to the original explanatory question, except that it will be phrased in normative or counterfactual terms. It explicates how the various parts ought to be configured, behave, and interact, or how they would have been configured and how they would have behaved and interacted, were the artifact to function properly. 5 Even if one does not think that this answer is valuable in and of 4 One might argue over whether cases of worn-out artifacts properly belong under the heading of malfunction. For example, light bulbs are apparently designed so as to stop working after a certain amount of burning hours. I can see that one might interpret this as evidence that wearing out is in fact part of the proper function of a light bulb. For brevity's sake I will ignore this terminological quibble while taking it to be uncontroversial that a worn-out artifact still has a proper function.
5 Establishing the truth of counterfactual claims is a notoriously troublesome issue, which I cannot hope to address to any satisfactory extent here. I rely on an intuitive way of thinking about it, but will Final Draft -January 20, 2006 13 itself, it should be obvious that it has instrumental value as background knowledge for determining the causes of malfunction. Only in contrast to how the artifact was supposed to work will it become possible to find out how it malfunctions.
Unlike scientific explanations of natural phenomena, technological explanations can inherit the normativity of function ascriptions. Although we might claim that photons 'ought' to behave as particles, this only goes so far as the theory from which we infer this claim has been inductively supported or as our previous experiences lend inductive support to such a claim.
Such claims merely express inductively supported expectations about phenomena.
Technological explanations, however, can incur an extra and stronger type of normativity in that there are independently ascertainable and objective facts of the matter as to how the artifact and its components ought to behave. These facts are grounded in the justified beliefs, intentions, and communicative actions of the designer(s) who devised the artifact or in the beliefs, intentions, and actions of the (group of) users who put the artifact to a new use that has gradually become widespread standard use. 6 Under the assumption that she is competent, 6 For brevity's sake, I will ignore such user-imparted proper functions for the rest of this section, but a story very similar to the story I am about to tell can be told about them.
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14 correct beliefs about the workings of the artifacts they devise, skillfully build the artifacts they devise (or see to it that this gets done), and truthfully communicate about functions, will we have additional reasons, beyond mere past experience or other inductive support, for claiming that artifacts ought to behave such-and-such.
Looking at the kinds of justification involved can further bring out the difference. The justification for ought-claims about malfunctioning artifacts differs in kind from the sorts of justification we might have for normative statements about the behavior of natural objects. Of course, designers base their beliefs on scientific theories or practical experience with the materials they use and in this sense their knowledge about artifacts parallels the sort of knowledge scientists have about natural phenomena. An engineer's claim that an iron bar ought not to buckle under a specific pressure does not differ in kind from the claim that a photon ought to behave as a particle; both are supported by normal scientific evidence. For non-designers, however, another story must be told. Provided the competence assumption mentioned above is warranted -as it certainly seems to be in our society -they can take the An agent a [justifiably, JdR] ascribes the capacity to f as a function to an artifact x, relative to a use plan p for x and relative to an account A, iff:
I. the agent a has the belief that x has the capacity to f, when manipulated in the execution of p, and the agent a has the belief that if this execution of p leads successfully to its goals, this success is due, in part, to x's capacity to f;
C. the agent a can justify these two beliefs on the basis of A; and E. the agents d who developed p have intentionally selected x for the capacity to f and have intentionally communicated p to other agents u. 18 its proper function(s). Secondly, the beliefs that x can f and that its doing so contributes to the realization of the use plan's goal need to be justifiable on the basis of an account A (which is itself subject to normal standards of justification). This account can take on a number of forms; for new, inexperienced users it can be simple testimony or observation (having heard that this contraption is a laser pointer, or having read the inscriptions on the package), for technically savvy users who enjoy taking apart their electrical appliances, it can be practical insight in their internal workings combined with experiential knowledge, and for engineers, it will typically be full-fledged technological and scientific explanations, often combined with practical experience from prototype tests. Thirdly, as foreshadowed in the previous sections, the notion of function turns out to be a relational one. To put it somewhat crudely, artifacts by themselves do not have functions; they acquire functions in a context of use plans, users and designers, and their justified beliefs, intentions, and actions.
Does this function theory account for the normativity of proper function ascriptions? Its creators think it does and I am inclined to agree with them. For brevity's sake, I will not laboriously go over a host of examples that the theory successfully covers, but limit myself to an outline of its general strategy for coping with the normativity of function ascriptions and a discussion of one worry. 9 Since agents only need justified beliefs, as opposed to knowledge, about the artifact's capacities, the theory allows for cases in which an agent's beliefs are defeated by later evidence. In this way, one can ascribe functions to malfunctioning artifacts. I may have every reason for believing that my phone has the appropriate capacities to allow me to call my mother and fulfill all the other conditions laid down by the theory and, by that token, be justified in ascribing the function of allowing for conversations at a distance to it, 9 A more elaborate discussion of the theory can be found in Vermaas 2004, 2005; Vermaas and Houkes 2006) . This example, however, does raise a concern, for the theory seems to imply that once I have learned of my phone's malfunctioning, I can no longer ascribe the same proper function to it because I no longer have the belief that it has the capacity to transmit my voice to the other end of the line. That is a counterintuitive result. To deal with cases like these, we must modify condition I. The agent does not have to have the belief that x can f but may also have the overriding belief that x would have been able to f, had particular counteracting interferences not occurred, or that it ought to be able to f given what the designers communicated about x. In short, condition I should read: agent a has the belief that x has or should have the capacity to f, etc. (and, of course, a must be able to justify this belief too).
With this modified condition in place, I can still ascribe the function of teleconversation to my phone after learning about the removed microphone, for I am justified in believing that it would have had that capacity, had someone not been playing this joke on me.
10, 11
So far so good then. The next task is to see if this function theory matches up with an account of technological explanation in the way I envisaged. Not unexpectedly, I think it does. As I argued above, such an account of explanation must deal with explanations that explicate how artifacts are able to exhibit various behaviors, and the behavior associated with their function in particular. I think the resources for this are available in the literature on mechanistic explanation, although they have not always been clearly recognized and 10 To be complete, I should add that for situations where an artifact malfunctions due to normal wear and tear, the I-condition must be modified to include something like 'agent a knows that x used to have the capacity to f but has now stopped having that capacity due to normal wear and tear'. (1) we have a false but justified belief that the artifact has the capacity to function, (2) we have a justified (and true) belief that the artifact should have the capacity to function (in the sense described earlier), or (3) we know that the artifact used to have the capacity to function, but that it is now worn-out. In all three cases, it seems to me perfectly That means that they will have justified beliefs about the physicochemical properties of the artifact and its components, the components' configuration and interactions, and their behavioral capacities. But the justification for these beliefs, and hence for the explanation, in no way depends on the function ascription; instead it is based on the normal justificatory mechanisms for beliefs about stuff in the world: observation, experiments, experience, and testimony. So if an engineer ascribes a function to a malfunctioning artifact, the normativity of this ascription is in the end epistemic, derivative of the normativity of epistemic justification. Although the justification for a function ascription will, for some persons, rely
Final Draft -January 20, 2006 23 on a technological explanation, the justification for this explanation in its turn does not rely on the function ascription and therefore there is no justificatory circularity here.
Persons lacking access to technological explanations who make function ascriptions justify these ascriptions by observation, experience, or testimony. In addition to the normative force of good justifications, these laypersons have an additional normative claim that entitles them to say that an artifact ought to have a certain proper function and fulfill it properly, as elaborated in the previous section. The epistemic division of labor in our society is such that professional engineers are entrusted with the task of designing properly functioning contraptions for various purposes. Laypersons have a legal and 'social-epistemic' right to expect engineers to have true beliefs about the workings and functions of the artifacts they make and to trust their testimony. 13 Whatever the details of this arrangement, we do not stumble on a justificatory circle here and that is the point I wanted to argue. The circularity worry is misplaced and the combination of the ICE theory of function ascriptions and my account of technological explanation can bear the burden. For all I can see, the two together deal adequately with the normativity of proper function ascriptions and technological explanations.
Conclusion
Against Peter Kroes I have argued that technological explanations are not necessarily special Final Draft -January 20, 2006 24 normativity buck to the first project. The principal reason for distinguishing these projects is that the property of having a proper function is relational, or extrinsic, whereas the property of having the capacity to exhibit a particular behavior is intrinsic. Consequently, accounting for the property of having a proper function must take the artifact's context into account, while accounting for the property of having a behavioral capacity can be done by looking just at the artifact itself. I have also argued that my way of framing the problem is more than wishful thinking, because Vermaas and Houkes's ICE function theory and my account of technological explanation do a good job in meeting the requirements I set out for the two projects. Besides, they fit together fine in the way I envisioned at the beginning of this paper.
